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Abstract
This paper analyses the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
on the rights of defence as enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In particular, it assesses Strasbourg jurisprudence on the right 
to be heard and on the right to access documents. The paper considers whether 
the practice in EU competition law procedures complies with the fair trial 
standards that follow from Strasbourg judgments. Based on this assessment, the 
paper provides an answer to the question whether there is an overcompensation 
or undercompensation of fundamental rights protection in EU competition law 
procedures. 
Résumé
Cet article analyse la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme 
sur les droits de la défense stipulés dans l’article 6 de la Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme. Principalement, il fait une évaluation de la jurisprudence 
sur le droit d’être entendu et le droit d’accès aux documents. L’article considère 
si la pratique prévue par le droit de la concurrence de l’UE est en conformité 
avec les normes d’un procès équitable qui découlent de la jurisprudence de 
Strasbourg. En basant sur cette évaluation, cet article répond à la question s’il 
y a une surcompensation quant à la protection des droits fundamentaux dans les 
procédures en droit de la concurrence, ou plutôt le contraire.
Classifications and key words: article 6 ECHR; article 47 Charter; article 41 
Charter; fundamental rights as a general principle of EU law; public enforcement; 
defence rights; right to be heard; right to access documents
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1. Introduction
The right to be heard is the cornerstone of fair administrative proceedings 
and of a fair trial. In the broader sense of the word, the right to be heard 
includes the right to an oral hearing and the right to access documents. One 
could even argue that both rights are intertwined as an oral hearing allows 
parties to develop their arguments (based on the written allegations made 
against them). 
The right to be heard has long since been “deeply entrenched” in the EU 
legal order as a general principle of law1. Since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon2, the right to be heard has been introduced into the EU 
legal system as a binding fundamental right. Article 41 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter: Charter) concerning 
the right to good administration has been qualified as the “benchmark” for 
the interpretation and application of the right to be heard3. Article 41 (2) (a) 
stipulates: “the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure 
which would affect him or her adversely is taken”. With respect to the scope of 
this right, the Charter requires that it shall be the same as the corresponding 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, (hereafter: ECHR) 
and as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: 
ECtHR)4. This means, in essence, that the minimum standard of safeguarding 
fundamental rights protection is set by the ECHR. At the same time, however, 
EU law can offer greater (procedural) protection than the ECHR. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the right to be heard under 
EU law complies with the ECHR, more particularly with Article 6 ECHR. 
Although the text of Article 6 ECHR speaks of a fair “trial” (and not of fair 
“administration”), it will be shown that merely administrative procedures also 
enjoy the protection of a fair hearing as prescribed by Article 6 ECHR. The 
1 J. Flattery, “Balancing efficiency and justice in EU competition law: elements of procedural 
fairness and their impact on the right to a fair hearing”, (2010) 7 Competition Law Review 54. 
See e.g. C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal [1996] ECR I-5387, para 21.
2 See Art. 6 paras 1 and 2 TEU. The Lisbon Treaty resulted in the Charter becoming 
equivalent to primary EU Treaties and binding on all EU institutions and in the accession of 
the Union to the ECHR. Such accession shall not, however, affect the Union’s competences 
as defined in the Treaties.
3 I. Rabinovici, “The right to be heard in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union”, (2012) 18(1) European Public Law 150.
4 The “conformity clause” in Art. 52 para 3 of the Charter states that “In so far as the Charter 
contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”.
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analysis consists of three parts. First, the standard of the ECHR on the right 
to be heard will be determined. Second, the jurisprudence of the EU judiciary 
on the right to be heard will be discussed. Third, an analysis will be conducted 
whether current administrative competition law proceedings comply with the 
standards set by the Strasbourg Court. In conclusion, the question will be 
answered on the conformity of the current competition law procedure with 
the right to be heard. In addition, the question will be addressed whether 
the application of the different sources of fundamental rights leads to an 
overcompensation or undercompensation of fundamental rights protection 
in the EU legal order.
2. The scope of Article 6 ECHR
2.1. The criminal charge qualification
As stated, the minimum level of fundamental rights protection in EU 
competition law procedures is set by the ECHR. Article 6 ECHR represents 
the main provision on the right to a fair trial. It applies to two different types 
of procedures. First, it covers procedures where there is a dispute about 
civil rights & obligations. Second, it offers protection to procedures leading 
to criminal charges5. The first category, civil rights & obligations, remains 
under the “sole” protection of Article 6, para 1, ECHR. The second category, 
involving criminal charges, is at the same time protected by fundamental rights 
listed in Article 6, paras 2 and 3, ECHR (such as: the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, the right to be informed about the accusations, etc.). 
The ECtHR gives a very broad, autonomous interpretation of the term 
“criminal”. The rationale underpinning this autonomous interpretation is that 
in a case where the classification of an offence in the law of the contracting 
parties was regarded as decisive, a state would be free to avoid the Convention’s 
obligation to ensure a fair trial6. In the Engel case, the ECtHR laid down 
three conditions for the classification of a charge as criminal under Article 6 
ECHR: (a) the classification of the offence as criminal under national law; 
(b) the nature of the offence; and (c) the degree of severity of the penalty. 
5 Such a distinction can also be found in the Charter. Art. 47 of the Charter, which is 
equivalent to Art. 6 ECHR, does not make such a distinction. A contrario, Art. 48 (presumption 
of innocence and rights of defense) and Art. 49 (principles of legality and proportionality of 
criminal offences and penalties), solely apply to a person “who has been charged”. 
6 D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on human 
rights, Oxford OUP 2009, p. 205.
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The first condition carries a formal and relative value only. If an offence is 
criminal under national law, it is also criminal under Article 6 ECHR. But if 
an offence is not criminal under national law, the domestic classification of the 
given offence is “no more than a starting point”7. Under this condition, it is 
therefore irrelevant that the EU prescribes that the penalties for competition 
law infringements shall not be of a criminal nature8. 
In cases where the offence is not classified as criminal in national law, the 
other two conditions listed above come into play. These two conditions are 
alternative and not cumulative; a cumulative approach may be adopted where 
neither condition by itself is conclusive9. As to the nature of the offence its 
purpose must be deterrent, punitive and not compensatory. In addition the 
offence must have a general application. With respect to the third condition, 
the ECtHR emphasized the importance of the nature and severity of the 
possible – not the actual – punishment. Therefore, the “relative lack of 
seriousness of the penalty” cannot deprive an offence of its criminal nature10. 
In order to enjoy the full protection of Article 6 ECHR, one should also 
make sure that there is a “charge”. According to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, the charge starts when “an official notification is given to an individual 
by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal 
offence” or follows from some other act which carries “the implication of 
such an allegation and which likewise substantially affects the situation of the 
suspect”11. Article 6 ECHR covers the whole of the proceedings, including 
appeal proceedings and the determination of the sentence12.
2.2. The Jussila distinction
The conclusion that competition law fines are to be considered criminal 
under the ECHR is not without problems. The autonomous interpretation 
 7 Engel v Netherlands (1976) Series A no 22, para 82.
 8 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU [2003] OJ L1/1 (“Regulation 1/2003”), Art. 23 para 5.
 9 Janosevic v Sweden (2002) 38 EHHR 473, para 67; Ezeh and Connors v the United 
Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 1, para 86; Bendenoun v France (1994) Series A no 284, para 47; 
Lauko v Slovakia (1998) 33 EHRR 994, para 57; Garyfallou AEBE v Greece (1997) 28 EHRR 
344, para 33.
10 Öztürk v Germany (1984) Series A no 73, para 54. See also Lutz v Germany (1987) Series 
A no 123, para 55.
11 Deweer v Belgium (1980) Series A no 35, para 46; Eckle v Germany (1982) Series A no 51, 
para 73; Foti e.a. v Italy (1982) Series A no 56, para 52; and Quinn v Ireland (2000) 33 EHHR 
264, para 41.
12 Phillips v United Kingdom (2001) ECHR 2001-VII.
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of the notion of a criminal charge has underpinned a gradual broadening of 
the classification as criminal to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional 
categories of criminal law, for example administrative penalties13. Due to the 
significant enlargement of the area of “criminality” under Article 6 ECHR, 
the ECtHR made in the Jussila case a distinction between hardcore and non-
hardcore criminal offences, using competition law as an example of a field of 
law that falls within the periphery of criminal law14. 
“Notwithstanding the consideration that a certain gravity attaches to 
criminal proceedings, which are concerned with the allocation of criminal 
responsibility and the imposition of a punitive and deterrent sanction, it is 
self-evident that there are criminal cases which do not carry any significant 
degree of stigma. There are clearly ‘criminal charges’ of differing weight”15. 
Following the ECtHR, the criminal-head guarantees laid down in Article 6 
ECHR do not necessarily apply with their full stringency to cases belonging 
to the periphery of criminal law. The ECtHR used the severity of the sanction 
and the stigma attached to the offence in order to conclude that certain fields 
of law, such as competition law, fall outside the hard core of criminal law16. 
In Jussila, the ECtHR dealt with the question whether the lack of an oral 
hearing before the court lead to an infringement of Article 6 ECHR. In this 
case the difference between hardcore and softcore criminal charges was 
decisive for the outcome of the case. The ECtHR held here that exceptional 
circumstances in cases not belonging to the traditional categories of criminal 
charges may justify dispensing of such a hearing17: “there may be proceedings 
in which an oral hearing may not be required, for example where there are 
13 Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39, para 43.
14 See, a contrario, the EFTA Court judgment in a case that concerned a decision of the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority sanctioning Norgen Poste for an abuse of a dominant position and 
imposing a fine of EUR 12.89 million. The EFTA Court held therein that fines for competition 
law infringements belong to hardcore criminal charges. Case E-15/10 Posten Norge AS v EFTA 
Surveillance Authority (EFTA Court, 18.04.2012), para 90. For more on this case see: J. Temple 
Lang, “Judicial review of competition decisions under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the importance of the EFTA Courts: The Norway Post Judgment”, (2012) 37 
European Law Review 464-480.
15 Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39.
16 Note that this categorization of criminal offences under Art. 6 has no basis in the 
Convention. See the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides, joined by Judges Zupančič 
and Spielmann under the case Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39.
17 The ECtHR considered that a normal criminal trial (i.e. cases falling within the hardcore 
of criminal law) requires fundamental guarantees in the form of publicity, such as a public 
hearing. In other cases (i.e. administrative), the ECtHR accepted that the lower instance may 
not qualify as independent and impartial tribunals and that the hearing before them may not 
be public. See in this respect also: ECtHR judgment of 5 April 2012 in case Societe Bouygues 
Telecom v France App no 2324/08, para 71.
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no issues of credibility or contested facts which necessitate a hearing and 
the courts may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the 
parties’ submissions and other written materials”18. The ECtHR emphasized 
that national authorities may have regard to the demands of efficiency and 
economy in deciding whether or not to hold an oral hearing19.
2.3.  Application of the criminal charge criteria to EU competition law 
proceedings
2.3.1. “Classic” fining procedure
It is not surprising by looking at the Engel-criteria that the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR has been expanding the scope of criminal safeguards provided in 
Article 6 ECHR to a wide range of administrative proceedings, such as those 
concerning competition law. In the Menarini case, the ECtHR reaffirmed20 
that competition law proceedings are under the full protection of Article 6 
ECHR21. In EU competition law procedures22 this protection starts when the 
Commission informs the concerned undertakings in writing of the objection 
raised against them. For Article 6 ECHR to apply, it is therefore not necessary 
that there is a “trial”.
Neither ECHR jurisprudence nor academic literature have so far touched 
upon the question whether criminal charges are also involved where an 
undertaking does not get a fine (for example in a commitment procedure23) 
18 Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39, para 41.
19 Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39, para 42.
20 See e.g. the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in case Société 
Stenuit v France (1992) Series A no 232-A.
21 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011 in case Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy App 
no 43509/08, paras 40-45. The criminal character of competition law fines has been accepted 
by EU courts e.g.: C-199/92 P Hüls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, para 150; C-189/02 
P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri v Commission [2005] 
ECR I-5425, para 202.
22 In this paper the term “EU competition law procedures” denotes Art. 101 and 102 
procedures.
23 The Hearing Officer of the Commission, Wouter Wils, does however see a fundamental 
difference between cases where the Commission imposed fines for infringements of Art. 101 
and 102 TFEU and cases where one should decide whether or not to accept commitments 
pursuant to Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003. According to Wils, it is this difference that makes it 
legitimate for EU courts to leave the Commission with a broad margin of discretion and endorse 
the manifest error-test when ruling upon commitment procedure cases. See W.P.J. Wils, “The 
compatibility with fundamental rights of the EU antitrust enforcement system in which the 
European Commission acts both as investigator and as first-instance decision maker”, (2014) 
37(1) World Competition 14-16.
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or where an undertaking receives a fine reduction (under the settlement 
procedure or the leniency procedure). It remain unclear whether all of the 
procedural rights of Article 6 ECHR should apply in their full grandeur with 
respect to such cases. 
2.3.2. Commitment procedures
The first procedure which might fall outside the scope of Article 6 ECHR 
is the commitment procedure. Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 provides for 
the adoption of decisions by the Commission whereby undertakings make 
legally-binding commitments as to their future behaviour. One of the main 
advantages of this procedure is that the Commission will close its file without 
making a finding of an infringement. This is a formal procedure that will be 
initiated by the Commission by sending a “preliminary assessment” of the 
case (in contrast to a statement of objections) to the undertakings involved. 
The undertakings have a given period of time to respond and to offer draft 
commitments24. These commitments cannot qualify as criminal charges because 
they (i) do not have a general application; and (ii) lack the qualification of 
a deterrent and punitive sanction (the commitments are voluntarily offered 
by the undertaking).
The commitment can, however, fall under the first category of Article 6 
ECHR (civil rights & obligations). The ECtHR held on several occasions that 
the key determinant in cases involving state actions is whether the right or 
obligation in question is pecuniary in nature or has pecuniary consequences for 
the applicant25. According to the ECtHR, the right to property is clearly a right 
with a pecuniary character. This means that a state action which is directly 
decisive for property rights is determinative of civil rights and obligations, 
and hence governed by Article 6 ECHR26. The same applies to the right to 
engage in a commercial activity which similarly has a pecuniary character27. 
On the basis of these cases, it can be assumed that commitments, such as the 
divestiture of assets, have a pecuniary character. 
However, in order for Article 6 ECHR to apply there must be a dispute 
between the undertaking and the state (i.e. competition authority). A dispute 
may concern a question of fact or a question of the law28; it is not necessary 
that the dispute relates to the actual existence of a right (it may also be related 
24 R. Which & D. Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford OUP 2012, p. 257.
25 Editions Periscope v France, Series A no 234-B (1992); and Stran Greek Refineries and 
Stratis Andreadis v Greece, Series A no 301-B (1994). 
26 D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the…, op. cit., p. 214.
27 Benthem v Netherlands (1985) Series A no 97.
28 Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) Series A no 58.
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to its scope)29. Given that the commitment procedure is voluntary, such 
dispute on the substance of an Article 9 decision it thus unlikely. As a result, 
the commitment procedure falls completely outside the scope of Article 6 
ECHR. Illustrative here is the Commission v Alrosa case where the CJ held 
that Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 procedures are based on considerations of 
procedural economy30.
2.3.3. Leniency procedures
The leniency procedure is another procedure to which, possibly, not all 
procedural safeguards of article 6 ECHR apply. The usage of the phrase 
“leniency procedure” is, however, somewhat confusing as it is not a different 
type of procedure (in contrast to the standard fining procedure, commitment 
procedure and the settlement procedure) – leniency applicants may or may 
not be involved both in the standard fining procedure and in the settlement 
procedure31.
Under the leniency procedure, the Commission will grant immunity from 
fines to an undertaking that is the first to blow the whistle32. An undertaking 
that does not meet the conditions of the Commission may be eligible to 
benefit from a fine reduction33. One of the conditions to determine whether 
29 Le Compte, Van Leeuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) Series A no 43. 
30 C-441/07 P Alrosa v Commission, [2010] ECR I-05949, para 35.
31 See on the leniency procedure i.e. W.P.J. Wils, “Leniency in antitrust enforcement: 
theory and practice”, (2007) 30(1) World Competition 25-64; P. Billiet, “How lenient is the EC 
Leniency Policy? A matter of certainty and predictability”, (2009) 30(1) European Competition 
Law Review 14-20; J Sandhu, “The European Commission’s leniency policy: a success?”, 
(2007) (28)3 European Competition Law Review 148-157; J.M. Griffin & K.R. Sullivan, “Recent 
Developments in Leniency Policy and Practices in Canada, the European Union and the 
US”, Paper presented at the ABA Advanced International Cartel Workshop in San Francisco, 
30 January–1 February 2008; D. Arp & C.A. Swaak, “A tempting offer: immunity from fines for 
cartel conduct under the European Commission’s new leniency notice”, (2003) (24)1 European 
Competition Law Review 9-18; S. Blake & D. Schnichels, “Leniency following modernization: 
safeguarding Europe’s leniency programmes”, (2004) (25)12 European Competition Law Review 
765-770; and C. Hodges, “Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is the 
case?”, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1382-1407.
32 Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] 
OJ C 298/11 (“Leniency Notice”), paras 8 (a), 8 (b), 10 and 11. The undertaking applying for 
immunity must provide the Commission with information (such as a corporate statement) and 
evidence of its participation in the alleged cartel. Immunity will not be granted if, at the time 
of the submission, the Commission had already sufficient evidence to carry out an inspection 
or had already carried out such an inspection.
33 Leniency Notice paras 23 and 24. In order to qualify for a fine reduction, the undertaking 
must provide the Commission with evidence that represents “significant added value” with 
respect to that already in the Commission’s possession.
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a procedure is criminal is the nature and severity of the possible punishment. 
The possible punishment for a leniency applicant is, throughout the whole 
administrative procedure, the imposition of a fine of maximum 10% of its total 
turnover34. The promise of the Commission to grant immunity is conditional 
(it depends on the leniency applicant’ cooperation during the administrative 
procedure35) and becomes final once the authority adopted its decision36. In 
this respect the position of the leniency applicant equals, as said above, the 
position of any other (cartel) participants in an administrative procedure.
There are, however, three important differences. One difference relates 
to the moment starting from which a leniency applicant can enjoy the 
protection of Article 6 ECHR. Unlike in the standard fining procedure, this 
moment is not when the Commission sends its statements of objections to the 
investigated undertakings, but once leniency applicants decide to admit that 
they had committed the infringement and contact the Commission. From that 
moment onwards the position of the undertaking (c.q. leniency applicants) is 
“substantially affected”37. 
The second difference touches upon the fact that the undertaking, whilst 
applying for leniency, actually admits its participation in the alleged anti-
competitive behaviour. For that reason there are no (or substantially less) 
issues of credibility or contested facts that require the use of certain defence 
rights38. Nevertheless, during the stage of informal discussions with the 
Commission, leniency applicants have the possibility to hear the allegations 
of the Commission, the classification of the facts of the case, the gravity and 
duration of the alleged cartel, etc. These discussions already enable leniency 
applicants to assert their views and to straighten out certain facts. A reduced 
application of certain defence rights in leniency procedures seems therefore 
completely in line with ECtHR jurisprudence where the Strasbourg Court held 
that a less stringent application of procedural rights is possible when there are 
no contested facts that demand, for example, an oral hearing39. 
34 Regulation 1/2003 Art. 23 para 2.
35 Leniency Notice para 12 (a).
36 Illustrative is the Deltafina case where the Commission withdrew its (conditional) promise 
to grant immunity. The practice of the Commission has been confirmed by the General Court: 
T-12/06 Deltafina v Commission, not yet reported. 
37 At that moment the undertakings have “learnt of the investigation or begun to be affected 
by it”. See Eckle v Germany (1982) Series A no 51, para 74.
38 At least from the perspective of the leniency applicant. The other undertakings might 
want to contest the credibility of the statements by cross-examining the leniency applicant. 
See for a discussion A.E. Beumer, “The cross-examination of leniency applicants in EU cartel 
proceedings”, (2013) Concorrenza e Mercato, 5-26.
39 See the discussion of the Jussila case above. 
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The third difference concerns the position of the leniency applicants during 
a possible appeal procedure. In contrast to an “ordinary” appeal procedure 
where an undertaking appeals the fine imposition, an appeal procedure started 
by a leniency applicant has lost its qualification as deterrent and punitive 
when the Commission decided to grant that undertaking immunity from 
fines. As a consequence, the leniency applicant can no longer rely on the full 
protection of Article 6 ECHR. A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect 
to leniency applicants that received a fine reduction. Although undertakings 
receiving a fine reduction still have to pay a (punitive) fine, one could argue 
that the conviction became final once the leniency applicant admitted to 
committing the infringement in order to get lenient treatment. For that reason, 
it is legitimate to argue that the leniency applicants cannot invoke in an appeal 
procedure the extended protection provided by Article 6 ECHR.
2.3.4. Settlement procedures
The essence of the settlement procedure is that the undertakings, having 
heard the objections of the Commission, acknowledge their involvement in the 
cartel. In exchange, the Commission grants them a 10% reduction in the fine that 
it would have otherwise imposed upon them40. In line with the argumentation 
presented about leniency applicants that received a fine reduction, one could 
argue that once the settlement applicant admitted its involvement in the 
infringement, it can no longer rely on the whole package of legal protection 
provided by Article 6 ECHR. This applies both to the administrative phase of 
the procedure as well as to the possible appeal procedure. It is interesting to 
note in this context that the Commission, unlike in the leniency procedures, 
provides for certain procedural efficiencies already during the administrative 
procedure41. These procedural efficiencies take place once the settlement 
discussions are successful and the parties make a formal settlement submission 
where they admit to their participation in the infringement and waive their 
further rights to be heard (access to the file and an oral hearing) after the 
statement of objections42. Such a waiver of procedural rights is not a problem 
40 Commission Regulation 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation773/2004, as 
regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases [2008] OJ L 171/3 (“Settlement 
Regulation”). See also Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of 
the adoption of decisions pursuant to Articles 7 and 23 of Council Regulation 1/2003 in cartel 
cases [2008] OJ C 167/1 (“Settlement Notice”).
41 See Commission Regulation 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 101 & 102 TFEU [2004] OJ L123/18 (“Regulation 773/2004”), 
Art. 10(a)(2).
42 Settlement Notice paras 17-22.
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according to ECtHR jurisprudence provided it is voluntary (e.g. there should 
be no improper compulsion)43.
2.4. Preliminary conclusions
The three paragraphs above discussed the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on the notion of a criminal charge and applied that jurisprudence to 
the EU competition law procedure. With the exception of the “classic” 
fining procedure, it can be concluded that it is not absolutely clear that 
informal enforcement procedures can be qualified as criminal charges. 
In addition, it is not obvious that procedural rights fully apply to these 
procedures. The above analysis showed diverging levels of procedural rights 
depending on the procedure. The outcome of this analysis can be found 
in the table below. 
Type of
enforcement procedure
Level of procedural 
guarantees: administration
Level of procedural 
guarantees: trial
Fining procedure Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3
Commitment procedure - Art. 6 para 1
Leniency procedure
(immunity)
Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 but Jussila Art. 6 para 1
Leniency procedure
(reduction)
Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 but Jussila Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 but Jussila
Settlement procedure Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 but Jussila Art. 6 paras 1, 2, 3 but Jussila
3. The right to be heard under Article 6 ECHR
3.1. The right to a fair hearing of Article 6 ECHR
After concluding on the basis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence that there 
could be diverging levels of procedural rights protection in EU competition 
law procedures, it is interesting to execute this model by means of a case 
study. This paper will use as a case study the right to be heard, which is part 
43 In addition, as mentioned by Wils, the undertaking should be fully aware of the conditions 
and consequences of a settlement. W.P.J. Wils, “The use of settlements in public antitrust 
enforcement: objectives and principles, (2008) 31(3) World Competition 348-351.
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of the wider right to a fair trial provided by Article 6 ECHR. It is important 
to stress that the right to a fair trial of Article 6 ECHR has an “open-ended, 
residual quality”. A number of specific rights have in fact been read into 
Article 6 ECHR through the medium of its fair hearing guarantee44. One 
of them is the right to an oral hearing in one’s presence45, which offers 
protection against arbitrary decisions46. The term “oral hearing” is somewhat 
confusing as it can refer to the right to a public hearing and the right of an 
oral hearing in one’s presence47. For the purpose of this paper, discussed will 
only be jurisprudence on oral hearings (paragraph 3.2) Another right which 
is not explicitly mentioned in Article 6 ECHR is that of access to one’s file 
(paragraph 3.2).
3.2. The right to an oral hearing
3.2.1. The scope of the right
With respect to criminal procedures, the ECtHR stipulated that there is 
a general right of the accused to attend the hearing48. Although the right to 
be heard is particularly relevant for criminal procedures (where the witnessing 
and monitoring of proceedings are of great importance49), it also extends to 
certain kinds of civil procedures. The right to be heard in civil procedures 
mainly applies to cases where the “personal character and manner of life’s 
44 D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the…, op. cit., p. 246.
45 ECtHR judgment of 12 February 1984 in case Colozza v Italy Appl no 9024/80, para 27. 
In this case the ECtHR held: “though this is not expressly mentioned in para 1 of Article 6, the 
object and purpose of that Article taken as a whole show that a person ‘charged with a criminal 
offence’ is entitled to take part in the hearing”.
46 Pretto and others v Italy (1983) Series A no 71. 
47 Also the ECtHR has sometimes difficulties with making a distinction between those two 
subrights of the more abstract right to an oral hearing. See e.g. ECtHR judgment of 26 May 
1988 in case Ekbatani v Sweden Appl no 10563/83; and ECtHR judgment of 21 September 2006 
in case Moser v Austria Appl no 12643/02.
48 ECtHR judgment of the 18 October 2006 in case Hermi v Italy Appl no 18114/02, para 
58; Lala v the Netherlands (1994) Series A no 297, para 33; Poitrimol v France (1993) Series A 
no 277, para 35; and ECtHR judgment of 12 February 2004 in case De Lorenzo v Italy (dec.) 
Appl no 69264/01.
49 D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the…, op. cit., p. 247. In criminal 
procedures the right to an oral hearing follows from the rights that are listed in Art. 6 
para 3 sub c, d and e ECHR. The ECtHR recalled that the principle of an oral and public 
hearing is particularly important in the criminal context where the accused must generally 
be able to attend a hearing at first instance (Tierce and Others v San Marino ECHR 2000-IX, 
para 94. 
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of the party concerned is directly relevant to the decision”50, or where the 
applicant’s conduct need to be assessed51 52. 
3.2.2. The exceptions
The right to be heard in civil procedures is not absolute; the question 
whether the applicant has a right to an oral hearing depends on the nature 
of the issues to be decided53. The ECtHR concluded in several social security 
cases that due to the highly technical nature of the case, the case was better 
dealt with in writing than in oral argument54. An oral hearing is not required 
in cases where only non-complex legal questions are being discussed55, neither 
it is necessary where oral statements will not present any added-value to the 
outcome of the case56.
The right to an oral hearing is limited also in criminal proceedings. The 
aforementioned Jussila case illustrates that an oral hearing may not be 
necessary in procedures (such as those relating to competition law) belonging 
to the periphery of criminal law. In Jussila, the ECtHR refused to give the 
applicant the right to an oral hearing because the judiciary was not persuaded 
that this particular case posed any issues of credibility that required an oral 
hearing (the contested issues of fact and law could be adequately addressed 
in, and decided on the basis of, written submissions)57. In the aftermath of 
Jussila, the ECtHR not only followed the same line of reasoning58 but also 
crystallized its previous jurisprudence by underlining that “the character of 
the circumstances which may justify dispensing with an oral hearing essentially 
50 ECtHR judgment of 30 June 1959 in case X v Sweden (dec.) Appl no 434/58.
51 Muyldermans v Belgium Series A no 214, para 64.
52 One exception is the Georgiadis case where the ECtHR held that “a procedure whereby 
civil rights are determined without ever hearing the parties” submissions cannot be considered 
to be compatible with Art. 6 para 1. See ECtHR judgment of 29 May 1997 in case Georgiadis 
v Greece Appl no 21522/93, para 40.
53 See for e.g. ECtHR judgment of 8 February 2005 in case Miller v Sweden Appl no 55853/00. 
54 ECtHR judgment of 24 June 1993 in case Schuler-Zgraggen v Switserland Appl no 14518/89; 
and ECtHR judgment of 12 November 2002 in case Döry v Switserland Appl no 28394/95.
55 ECtHR judgment of 1 June 2004 in case Valová, Slezák and Slezák v Slovak Republic 
Appl no 44925/98.
56 ECtHR judgment of 25 November 2003 in case Pursiheimo v Finland Appl no 57795/00. 
See, a contrario, the case Göç where the “personal nature of the applicant’s experience [related 
to his detention], and the determination of the appropriate level of compensation, required that 
he be heard”. See ECtHR judgment of 11 July 2002 in case Göç v Turkey Appl no 36590/97. 
57 Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 39, para 47. 
58 ECtHR judgment of 17 July 2007 in case Oy and Karanko v Finland Appl no 61557/00; 
Judgments of the ECtHR of 22 July 2008 Lehtinen v Finland Appl no 32993/02 and Kallio 
v Finland Appl no 40199/02.
VOL. 2014, 7(10)
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EU COMPETITION LAW PROCEDURES… 23
comes down to the nature of the issues to be dealt with by the competent 
court – in particular, whether these raise any question of fact or law which 
could not be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file”59.
The ECtHR concluded in the Flisar case, on the basis of the nature of the 
issue60, that the local court could not have properly determined the facts or 
the applicant’s guilt without a direct assessment of the evidence at an oral 
hearing. In this case, the applicant contested the conviction and challenged 
certain factual aspects of the case, including the credibility of certain police 
statements concerning his conduct (in contrast to the Suhadolc case which 
concerned evidence obtained by means of an objective method)61. This case 
emphasizes the importance of an oral hearing in criminal procedures when it 
can put the credibility of given statements or facts to the test62. 
3.2.3. The moment of the oral hearing
A related question is whether, where an oral hearing took place at first-
instance63 (for example during the administrative proceedings), the appeal 
court should also ensure an oral hearing. The ECtHR approached this 
question by reiterating that where a public hearing has been held at first 
instance, its absence may be justified at the appeal stage64. This holds 
particularly for: (1) appeal proceedings involving only questions of law65; and 
59 ECtHR judgment of 17 May 2001 in case Suhadolc v Slovenia (dec.) Appl no 57655/08. 
See also ECtHR judgment of 27 March 2003 in case Berdajs v Slovenia Appl no 10390/09.
60 Aside from the nature of the issues, the ECtHR attached importance to domestic 
regulations concerning the right to an oral hearing. According to the ECtHR, problems under 
Art. 6 ECHR will arise when the absence of an oral hearing flows from domestic law itself. 
ECtHR judgment of 3 October 2006 in case Karahanoğlu v Turkey Appl no 74341/01, paras 
36-39; ECtHR judgment of 6 December 2007 in case Súsanna Rós Westlund v  Iceland Appl 
no 42628/04, para 40; and ECtHR judgment of 4 March 2008 in case Hüseyin Turan v Turkey, 
Appl no 11529/02, paras 34-35.
61 ECtHR judgment of 29 September 2001 in case Flisar v Slovenia, Appl no 3127/09.
62 See also ECtHR judgment of 28 February 2013 in case Milenovič v Slovenia Appl 
no 11411/11, para 32.
63 An applicant can waive his/her right to an oral hearing, provided that the waiver is made 
“of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly”, is “established in an unequivocal manner”, 
is “attended by minimum safeguards”, and does “not run counter to any important public 
interest”. See D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates & C. Buckley, Law of the…, op. cit., p. 247 and 
case Sejdovic v Italy ECHR 2006-II, para 86. 
64 Fejde v Sweden (1991) Series A no 212, paras 27 and 31; and Kremzow v Austria (1993), 
Series A no 268, paras 58-59.
65 ECtHR judgment of 19 February 1996 in case Botten v Norway Appl no 16206/90, para 
39. See also Axen v Germany (1983) Series A no 72, paras 27-28; Kremzow v Austria (1993), 
Series A no 268, paras. 60-61; and ECtHR judgment 19 February 1998 in case Allan Jacobsson 
v Sweden (nr. 2) Appl no 16970/90, para 49.
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(2) appeal procedures where the court has full jurisdiction to examine both 
points of law and of fact66. With respect to situations where the appeal court 
has full jurisdiction, the ECtHR clarified that an oral hearing might anyway 
be required when the appeal raises any questions of fact or law which cannot 
be adequately resolved on the basis of the case file67. 
3.3. The right to access documents
3.3.1. The scope of the right
Like with respect to the right to an oral hearing, the right to access 
documents is not explicitly included in Article 6 ECHR. The right to access 
documents follows from the notion of equality of arms and the right to an 
adversarial procedure68. The right to an adversarial proceeding means that 
parties should have knowledge of, and should be able to, comment on all 
evidence adduced or observations filed with a view to influencing the court’s 
decision69. In a similar context, the principle of equality of arms requires that 
each party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case 
under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-
vis his opponent70. Basically, this implies that a party should have access to 
documents that the opponent filed or to documents which (otherwise) places 
the opponent at a substantial advantage.
With respect to civil procedures, the ECtHR confirmed that parties have 
only a limited right to access documents. It can only require disclosure of 
documents that can actually influence the judgment of the court. In the 
Yvon case, the ECtHR formulated this rule as follows: “In its opinion, the 
adversarial principle, thus defined, does not require that each party in civil 
66 Idem. See also Fejde v Sweden (1991) Series A no 212, para 33.
67 ECtHR judgment of 29 October 1991 in case Jan Åke Andersson v Sweden Appl 
no 11274/84, para 29; and ECtHR judgment of 1 July 1997 in case Rolf Gustafson v Sweden 
Appl no 23196/94. 
68 The requirements of equality of arms and adversarial procedure apply to criminal and 
civil procedures, but their actual scope is not exactly the same. The ECtHR stated: “This is 
borne out by the absence of detailed provisions such as paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 […]. 
Thus, although these provisions have a certain relevance outside the strict confines of criminal 
law […] the Contracting States have greater latitude when dealing with civil cases than they 
have when dealing with criminal case”. See Dombo Beheer v Netherlands (1993) Series A no 274, 
para 32. See also Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) Series A no 58, para 39; and ECtHR 
judgment of 23 October 1996 in case Levages Prestations Services v France Appl no 21920/93.
69 ECtHR judgment of 20 February 1996 in case Vermeulen v Belgium Appl no 19075/91, 
para 33.
70 Dombo Beheer v Netherlands (1993) Series A no 274, para 33; and Brandstetter v Austria 
(1991) Series A no 211, para 66.
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cases must transmit to its opponent documents which, as in the instant case, 
have not been presented to the court either”71.
The right to have access to documents that are in the possession of the 
court/ administrative authority, and which can influence the outcome of the 
case, is not absolute (as will be discussed below). An infringement of the right 
to a fair hearing will take place when a respondent State, without good cause, 
prevents parties from gaining access to documents in its possession which 
would have assisted them in defending their case72.
By contrast to civil procedures, criminal procedures should guarantee 
a much broader right to access documents, meaning that the right should 
extend to all incriminating and exculpating documents that are in the file of 
the prosecutor73. According to the ECtHR, unlimited access to documents is 
a very important safeguard in criminal procedures – it assures “the confidence 
of the parties of criminal proceedings in the workings of justice”74. Whether 
the judge will (or will not) use these documents in his /her assessment is 
irrelevant. According to the ECtHR, it is not the task of the prosecutor to 
assess whether the collected documents are relevant to the outcome of the 
case75. This means that the prosecutor may not decide, on his/her own motion, 
to withhold documents for or against the accused76. 
3.3.2. The exceptions
As said above, the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is limited; 
the fact that certain documents are not in the possession of one party will not 
automatically result in an infringement of Article 6 ECHR. In the Dowsett 
case, the ECtHR reiterated its jurisprudence where it had held that in criminal 
proceedings77 public interests may exist (such as: national security, the need to 
protect witnesses or the need to keep secret police methods of investigating 
crime) that justify the non-disclosure of evidence. Another legitimate 
reason to withhold certain evidence from the defence is the preservation of 
71 ECtHR judgment of 24 April 2003 in case Yvon v France Appl no 44962/98, para 38.
72 ECtHR judgment of 9 June 1998 in case McGinley and Egan v the United Kingdom Appl 
nos 21825/93 and 23414/94, paras 86 and 90.
73 Edwards v United Kingdom (1992) Series A no 247, para 46. 
74 ECtHR judgment of 22 March 2005 in case M.S. v Finland Appl no 46601/99.
75 ECtHR judgment of 31 March 2009 in case Nautinen v Finland Appl no 21022/04.
76 ECtHR judgment of 16 February 2000 in case Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom Appl 
no 28901/95.
77 With respect to civil proceedings, the ECtHR held that the scope of the right to access 
documents (including its restriction) depends on the specifics of each case. ECtHR judgment 
of 27 April 2010 in case Hudakova and other v Slovac Republic Appl no 23083/05, paras 26-27; 
and ECtHR judgment of 15 June 2005 in case Stepinska v France Appl no 1814/02.
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a fundamental right of another individual78. A restriction on the right to access 
documents is, however, only permitted when (i) it is strictly necessary; and 
(ii) the difficulties caused to the defense are sufficiently counterbalanced by 
the procedures followed by the judicial authorities79. Regarding specifically 
the existence of adequate procedural safeguards, the ECtHR rendered several 
judgments where it had held that the accused should be able to make an 
objection against the decision to withhold certain documents before a court 
that will balance the different interests80. Only when national law provides 
for such procedural guarantees might the non-disclosure of documents not 
violate Article 6 ECHR. 
3.4. Preliminary conclusions
The right to a fair hearing provided by Article 6 ECHR contains several 
sub-rights which are not explicitly mentioned. Two of them are the right to an 
oral hearing in one’s presence and the right to access documents. Both of them 
are not absolute rights, meaning that domestic practice might deviate from 
one of these rights in order to protect public interests or fundamental rights 
of others (in case of a disclosure request) or when the nature of the issue can 
be assessed on the basis of written materials (in case of an oral hearing). It 
seems that the ECtHR is specifically lenient with respect to the need of an oral 
hearing in procedures belonging to the periphery of criminal law. As explicitly 
mentioned in the Kammerer case, it is not excluded that such a differentiated 
application of procedural safeguards also applies to other procedural issues 
covered by Article 6 ECHR81. With respect to the right to access documents 
it seems that parties should (as the minimum safeguard) at least receive 
those documents that are part of the decision of the administrative authority 
or court. 
78 ECtHR judgment of 26 June 2006 in case Dowsett v United Kingdom Appl no 39482/98, 
para 41. See also Doornson v the Netherlands ECHR 1996-II, para 70. 
79 Van Mechelen and others v the Netherlands ECHR 1997-III, paras 54-58. 
80 ECtHR judgment of 16 February 2000 in case Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom Appl 
no 28901/95; Dowsett v United Kingdom Appl no 39482/98 (26 April 2003); and ECtHR judgment 
of 18 November 2003 in case Chadwich v United Kingdom (dec.) Appl no 54109/00.
81 ECtHR judgment of 12 May 2010 in case Kammerer v Austria Appl no 32435/06, 
para 27.
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4. The right to be heard under EU law
4.1 The right to an oral hearing
4.1.1 The standard of the EU legal order
The above paragraph illustrates the stance of the ECtHR towards the 
right to be heard under Article 6 ECHR. The EU right to be heard is 
spread over several legal sources. Article 41 of the Charter (the right to 
good administration) is the main provision in this context which states that 
every person has the right to be heard. In contrast to other provisions in 
the Charter82, Article 41 only applies, in principle, to measures taken by EU 
institutions83. However, it is also relevant, as a general principle, when the 
behavior of Member States falls within the scope of EU law84. The provision 
sets out two conditions for the application of the above right. First, it should 
concern an “individual measure” – this means that the right to be heard does 
not apply to legislative or regulatory measure. Second, the measure should 
“adversely affect” someone (see below)85.
According to the Explanations, Article 41 of the Charter “is based on the 
existence of the Union as subject to the rule of law whose characteristics 
were developed in the case-law which enshrined good administration as 
a general principle of law”. The study of the aforementioned cases shows 
that when assessing a case under Article 41 of the Charter the European 
judiciary is usually guided by the general principle of defence (and not of good 
administration)86. With respect to the applicability of the general principle to 
be heard (sub-category of the right of defence), jurisprudence shows that, in 
line with Article 41 of the Charter, a person has the right to an oral hearing 
in administrative proceedings when a proceeding was initiated against him/her 
 
82 The other Charter provision also applies to national measures that come within the scope 
of EU law. See e.g. C-671/10 Akerberg Fransson, not yet reported.
83 C-482/10 Cicala, not yet reported.
84 C-277/11 M.M., not yet reported. In this case, one can read an applicability of Art. 41 of 
the Charter to Member States with respect to the right to be heard in asylum cases. See also 
case C-604/12 H.N., not yet reported, paras 49-50. See also the opinion of Advocate General 
Bot of 7 November 2013 in C-604/12, H.N., para 36.
85 I. Rabinovici, “The right…”, op. cit., p. 150.
86 In the Kuhner case, the ECJ distinguished the general principle of good administration 
from more specific rights of defense. The Court held that only the latter were capable of 
conferring subjective rights on individuals. See joined cases 33/79 and 75/79 Kuhner v Commission 
[1980] ECR 1677, para 25.
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and might adversely affect a person87. The right to an oral hearing is, therefore, 
not limited to sanction proceedings88. The right to a hearing requires that the 
given natural or legal person has the opportunity to make its view known on 
the truth and relevance of the facts, charges, and circumstances relied upon 
by the decision-maker89.
4.1.2. The application of the right to competition law proceedings
The specific requirements of the right may differ depending on the 
type of proceedings. In competition law cases, the Commission must give 
the undertakings the opportunity of being heard on the allegations raised 
by the authority against them. The right to an oral hearing only relates to 
Commission decisions under Articles 7, 8, 23 and 24 (2) Regulation 1/200390. 
These provisions concern the finding of an infringement, the imposition of 
interim measures, the imposition of a fine, and the definitive fixing of a period 
penalty payment. The undertakings concerned should request an oral hearing 
in their written submissions91. In settlement procedures, parties must agree that 
they will not request an oral hearing unless the Commission does not reflect 
their settlement submissions in its statement of objections and the resulting 
decision92. The Hearing Officer, as an independent administrative officer, will 
organize such an oral hearing93. His task is to safeguard the effective exercise 
of procedural rights throughout the whole administrative procedure94. 
87 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission [1974] ECR 1063, para 15; 40/85 
Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2321, para 28; and T-450/93 Lisrestal v Commission [1994] 
ECR II-1177, para 42.
88 85/76 Hoffmann la Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 9. In this case, the ECJ 
limited the right to be heard to persons upon which sanctions may be imposed. This formula is 
reserved for antitrust cases in which normally sanctions are imposed. See I. Rabinovici, “The 
right…”, op. cit., p. 157.
89 85/76 Hoffmann la Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paras 9 and 11.
90 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 27 para 1, Regulation 773/2004 helps to define the extent of this 
right. See Regulation 773/2004, Arts. 10, 11, and 15. See on the oral hearing: W.P.J. Wils, “The 
oral hearing in competition proceedings before the European Commission”, (2012) 35(3) World 
Competition 397-430.
91 Regulation 773/2004, Art. 12.
92 Settlement Regulation.
93 Decision of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer 
in certain competition proceedings (2011) OJ L 275/59. 
94 See for more information about the role of the Hearing Officer W.P.J. Wils, “The role of 
the Hearing Officer in competition proceedings before the European Commission”, (2012) 35(3) 
World Competition; and N. Zingales, “The Hearing Officer in EU competition law proceedings: 
ensuring full respect for the right to be heard?”, (2010) 7(1) Competition Law Review.
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4.2. The right to access documents
4.2.1. The standard of the EU legal order
An essential precondition of an effective exercise of the right to be heard 
is the right to access documents95. Article 41 of the Charter includes “the 
right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy”. 
The Charter limits this right to “one’s file”, thereby excluding access to the 
files of other parties96. Third parties that would like to request access to the 
Commission’s file could do so by means of Article 42 of the Charter97. 
4.2.2. The application of the right to competition law proceedings
Undertakings are, in principal, entitled to have access to the Commission’s 
file98 for the purpose of preparing a representation in their own defence99. 
In competition proceedings, the European judiciary has made it clear that 
“the purpose of access to the file is in particular to enable the addressees 
of a statement of objections to acquaint themselves with the evidence in the 
Commission’s file, so that they can express their views effectively, on the basis 
of that information, on the conclusions reached by the Commission in its 
statement of objections”100.
The Commission has thus an obligation to give access to undertakings 
to all documents, both those in their favour or otherwise, which had been 
obtained during the course of the investigation. It is up to the undertakings 
to determine (on the basis of a list of all documents101) which documents are 
 95 K. Lenaerts & J. Vanhamme, “Procedural rights of private parties in the community 
administrative process”, (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 541.
 96 K. Kanska, “Towards administrative human rights in the EU. Impact oft he Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, (2004) 10(3) European Law Journal 318.
 97 Art. 42 of the Charter provides that any natural or legal person has a right to access 
documents of EU institutions. See also Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents (2001) OJ L 145/43. However, the legal bases of those rights are 
different. The general right of access to documents (Art. 42) is derived from the democracy 
principle, whereas the right to access to one’s file is an administrative procedural right. See 
H.P. Nehl, Principles of administrative procedure in EC law, Oxford Hart Publishing 1999, p. 60.
 98 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 27 para 2. 
 99 C-310/93 P BPB Industries and Britisch Gypsum v Commission [1995] ECR I-865, para 
25; T-65/89 BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission [1993] ECR II-389, para 
21; and T-161/05 Hoechst v Commission [2009] ECR II-3555, para 160.
100 Case T-24/07 ThyssenKrupp Stainless v Commission [2009] ECR II-2309, para 247.
101 Undertakings are informed of the contents of the Commission’s file by means of an 
annex to the statement of objections that lists all the documents in the file and indicating 
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relevant. In no case can the Commission exercise discretion in withholding 
certain documents because it considers them of no interest to the undertakings 
concerned102. A similar policy applies to settlement procedures with the minor 
difference that the Commission decides when to disclose the documents and 
the parties only receive access before their settlement submissions have been 
reflected in the statement of objections103. 
The requirement to disclose the file may, however, come into conflict with 
the confidentiality of certain documents and the obligation of the Commission 
to keep those documents secret104. A clear tension can be seen here between 
two principles – disclosure versus confidentiality. On the one hand, the 
Commission should disclose all documents that are collected during its 
administrative proceedings. On the other hand, it may not disclose confidential 
information; it is not surprising that competition law files contain a lot of 
confidential information. EU law accords confidential status to the following 
categories of documents: confidential documents belonging to third parties 
(such as business secrets and correspondence between undertakings and their 
lawyers), internal documents of the Commission, and correspondence between 
the Commission and NCAs105. Business secrets are afforded “very special 
protection”106. In the Soda-Ash cases, the General Court made it clear that 
the Commission must protect the business secrets of an undertaking in such 
a way as to cause the least possible interference with the right to a hearing, for 
example, by preparing a non-confidential version of the documents107. Third 
parties may never be given access to documents containing business secrets108 
unless the Commission (or, ultimately, the EU judiciary) decides that the rights 
of defence and the public interest in the administration of justice outweigh 
the protection of business secrets109. Particularly interesting is the discussion 
documents or parts thereof to which they may have access. See Commission Notice on the rules 
for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 
Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation 139/2004 (2005) OJ C 
325/07 (“Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file”), para 45.
102 Case T-30/91 Solvay SA v Commission [1995] ECR II-1775, para 81; and C-199/99 P 
Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I-11177, para 125.
103 Parties to settlement discussions may be informed by the Commission of its objections 
to their behavior, the evidence used to determine those objections, non-confidential versions of 
relevant documents; and the range of potential fines. See Regulation 773/2004, Art. 10(a)(2).
104 Art. 339 TFEU on professional secrecy.
105 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 27 para 2.
106 T. Tridimas. The general principles of EU law, Oxford OUP 2006, p. 389.
107 T30/91 Solvay SA  v Commission  [1995] ECR II1775; and T-36/91 ICI v Commission 
[1995] ECR I-1847.
108 53/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 1965, para 28; and 142/84 and 156/84 
BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR I-44787, para 21.
109 Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file, para 24.
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to what extent leniency documents can be protected from disclosure to third 
parties who wish to use those documents in an action for damages110. During 
such an action a third party could perhaps successfully claim access those 
documents in light of its general “human” right of defence111. 
4.3. Preliminary conclusion
The general right of defence has long since been part of the EU legal 
order. The right of defence applies to administrative proceedings which are 
initiated against a person and which may adversely affect that person. As 
such, this rule limits the application of the right of defence to the addressees 
of a Commission’s statement of objection. The right to be heard is a sub-
right of the right of defence. The right to be heard is limited to infringement 
decisions; commitment procedures are explicitly excluded from its ambit 
and settlement procedures have their own procedural framework. The right 
to access documents is another sub-right of the general right of defence. It 
applies to all procedures although an exception is provided for settlement 
procedures.
5. Analysis
The law on the defence rights of undertakings in EU competition law 
proceedings is still under development. The EU judiciary plays an important 
role in this context as it must specify the precise contours of the defence 
rights. Although legislation exists (Article 41 of the Charter), the EU judiciary 
rely mainly on previous jurisprudence on the general rights of defence. This 
is in line with the Explanation to the Charter, which explicitly mentions that 
Article 41 of the Charter is a “mere” codification of existing jurisprudence. 
Since the EU has the obligation to safeguard the minimum level of protection 
provided for by the ECHR, it is, however, surprising that the EU judiciary 
110 See on this discussion the following judgments: C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt 
[2011] ECR I-5161; and C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG and others, 
not yet published.
111 According to the proposed Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union (COM (2013) 404), corporate statements of leniency applicants 
are, however, documents which are protected from disclosure at all times. 
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does notassess these cases under Article 6 ECHR112. Having the EU judiciary 
to decide “autonomously” upon the interpretation of fundamental rights is 
not a problem as long as their interpretation leads to convergence or, perhaps 
better, progression of fundamental rights protection. 
In the second part of this paper, the assumption was confirmed that the 
level of procedural guarantees should correspond with the level of punishment. 
Only with respect to the “classic” fining procedure, an undertaking (not 
leniency applicant) can rely upon the full protection of Article 6 ECHR. This 
means that an undertaking should have a right to an oral hearing and access 
to the complete file of the Commission. In EU competition law proceedings 
undertakings have indeed the right to request an oral hearing. In addition, 
they can request access to all documents held in the file of the Commission. 
Exceptions to the right to access documents (confidentiality) differ, however, 
from ECtHR jurisprudence since the latter only accepts as a  legitimate 
exception (i) the protection of public interests, or (ii) the protection of 
fundamental rights of others. This means, in essence, that accepting the 
confidentiality of documents in EU competition law proceedings could run 
counter to the general right of adversarial proceedings and the principle of 
equality of arms.
 With respect to informal enforcement proceedings (leniency, settlement 
and commitment), ECtHR jurisprudence shows that a lower level of fair trial 
protection suffices. Specifically in commitment procedures, the Commission is 
not obliged to offer an oral hearing or to grant full access to the file. Both are 
not the case in EU competition law proceedings as an oral hearing is limited 
to infringement decisions and the right to access documents is limited to those 
to whom the Commission sends a statement of objections113. The Commission 
may offer a less stringent application of procedural rights (see discussion 
112 In the future, acts of the Commission would be reviewable by the ECHR as undertakings 
can lodge a complaint with the ECtHR against the EU. There is an on-going debate on whether 
the EU courts would preserve its responsibility for ensuring the respect of fundamental rights in 
the EU’s legal order. See the debate on the Bosphorus-case where the ECtHR held that the ECJ 
provided protection for human rights equivalent to that given by the ECtHR: Bosphorus Airways 
v Ireland (2006) 42 EHHR 1. For more on this subject, see: L.F.M. Besselink, The Protection 
of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon: The interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions 
(General Report of the XXV FIDE Congress Tallinn 2012).
113 In commitments procedures, once the Commission is convinced of the undertakings’ 
genuine willingness to propose commitments, the Commission will send a Preliminary Assessment 
in which it summarizes the main facts of the case and identifies its competition concerns. The 
Preliminary Assessment serves as a basis for the parties to put forward appropriate commitments 
or to better define previously discussed commitments. See F. Wagner-Von Papp, “Best and even 
better practices in commitment procedures after Alrosa: the dangers of abandoning the struggle 
for competition law”, (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 929-970.
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of the Jussila distinction) in settlement procedures because of demands of 
procedural efficiency and economy. It is interesting to note that settlement 
proceedings, with the prospect of achieving procedural efficiencies, already 
provide for such limited rights of defence114. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
does require that a waiver of procedural rights takes places in an unequivocal 
manner115.
It is surprising that one cannot find procedural efficiencies in leniency 
procedures where, similar to settlement procedures, undertakings voluntarily 
decide to cooperate with the Commission while the latter grants them a fine 
reduction as a means of compensation. This is even more peculiar as fine 
reductions in leniency procedures can be much more rewarding than in 
settlement (10% for settlement versus up to 100% for leniency). In addition, 
the fact that a leniency application can trigger the start of an investigation 
(whereas settlement applications are submitted at a later stage of the 
investigation) does not mean that a leniency applicant needs an oral hearing 
to “contest the credibility of the facts” (citing Jussila). The same applies to the 
leniency applicant’s right to access documents, which can be limited in time 
(only allowing access until the Commission sends a statement of objection) 
and in scope (limiting access to the documents that the Commission used to 
substantiate the infringement).
6. Conclusion
The present-day standards of the right to be heard granted to undertakings 
in EU competition law procedures complies with the legal standards of 
the ECHR. Regarding two types of enforcement procedures, the “classic” 
fining procedures and the leniency procedures, one can observe a potential 
undercompensation respectively overcompensation of fundamental rights 
protection. With respect to the “classic” fining procedure one could question 
the refusal of access to documents for reasons of confidentiality. Here 
one could, however, rebut this argument by claiming that such a refusal is 
justified on the ground that it protects the fundamental right of privacy.116 
114 As discussed above, assuming that the case does proceed to a settlement, the parties will 
not seek an oral hearing, nor will they request access to the file after receiving the statement 
of objections.
115 See text note 64.
116 Art. 8 ECHR. In the case Societe Colas Est the ECtHR held that Art. 8 ECHR may be 
construed as including the right to respect for a company’s registered office, branches or other 
premises. See Societe Colas Est v France EHRR 2004-17.
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The potential “overcompensation” of fundamental rights protection relates 
to leniency procedures where, in line with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
certain procedural efficiencies could be implemented. Both developments can 
be problematic. Undercompensation of fundamental rights protection runs 
counter to the procedural legitimacy of public enforcement of EU competition 
law and the basic notions of the rule of law. Overcompensation of fundamental 
rights protection may conflict with the goals of effective enforcement. It is 
well known that the Commission and the General Court face difficulties to 
adjudicate cases within a reasonable time frame. Giving leniency applicants 
the possibility to start interim litigation on alleged infringements of procedural 
rights will delay the proceedings even more. The latest Gascogne and Kendrion 
judgments illustrate that a delay of the “reasonable time requirement” 
might trigger undertakings to start damage actions against the EU117. These 
judgments touch upon a very delicate question: how to reconcile effective 
public enforcement with fundamental rights118? One way is to interpret the 
fundamental rights in a more flexible manner (Jussila!) and prevent the 
bestowal of more procedural rights on undertakings than actually required 
by the ECHR. 
117 40/12 P Gascogne Germany, not yet reported; C-50/12 P Kendrion, not yet reported; and 
C-58/12 P Gascogne, not yet reported.
118 See e.g. A. Scordamaglia-Tousis, EU cartel enforcement – reconciling effective public 
enforcement with fundamental rights, Alphen aan de Rijn 2013. 
